Effective judicial protection at the national level: the current utopia of procedural hurdles by Xanthaki, Helen
Effective judicial protection at the national level:  
the current utopia of procedural hurdles 
By Dr. Helen Xanthaki∗ 
 
In the long dispute on the balance between national procedural autonomy1 and effec-
tiveness of remedies for breaches of EC law, the latter seems to be the prevailing doc-
trine.2 Leaving aside the qualifiers to this position introduced by a number of cases 
brought before the ECJ,3 the right of EU citizens to access to justice by use of effective 
national remedies against state breaches of EC law remains. With it remains my fre-
quently confessed distrust of the effectiveness of such remedies brought before the na-
tional courts of the Member States.4 
 The hypothesis of this paper is that even after Francovich and the development 
of the state liability doctrine, national courts cannot be trusted with the task of securing 
effective judicial protection for EU citizens suffering damages from breaches of EC law 
by the state. For the purposes of this analysis, protection at the national level signifies 
judicial routes leading to compensation by use of the national courts. This includes na-
tional court cases where the state liability doctrine as a general principle of EC law is 
applied. In order to discuss protection at the national level in adequate detail, three 
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countries were selected as case studies: France, Italy and Greece. All three countries 
follow the civil legal tradition, thus facilitating their comparative analysis. All three 
countries are often accused of being amongst the worst violators of EC law, as demon-
strated by the number of infringement proceedings brought against them by the Com-
mission, thus rendering the conclusions of this analysis all the more crucial.  
 In July 1999, the new Greek Code of Administrative Procedure came into force.5 
Albeit mainly a mere codification of pre-existing provisions, the new Code regulated 
some issues -- such as enforcement of administrative judgments and the state’s obliga-
tion to comply with administrative judgments -- in a different manner. The novelty of 
the provisions, the consequent lack of interpretative works and implementing judg-
ments, as well as the lack of an express declaration by the Greek legislator on the status 
of pre-existing provisions that are abolished or modified after the new Code, render the 
final provisions of Greek law on these matters uncertain and unclear.6 For this reason, 
reference is made both to pre-existing laws and the new Articles of Code.  
 
A. PROCEDURAL CONDITIONS FOR ACHIEVEMENT OF COMPENSATION  
 
The main common feature of the French, Italian and Greek legal systems on the topic 
discussed in this paper (which primarily led to the methodological decision to examine 
all three jurisdictions in parallel) refers to their court structure. In the widely acceptable, 
classical Dutreil classification on the administration of justice in Europe, the three coun-
tries fall within the group of jurisdictions that follows the Latin model commonly found 
in the countries of the Council of Europe.7 The main characteristic of this model is the 
existence of a separate administrative jurisdiction, which is headed by an institution act-
ing as the highest administrative court and also as the legal councilor of the govern-
ment.8 Indeed, in all three selected countries, there is a separate court structure for ad-
ministrative justice headed by the French Conseil d’Etat, the Greek Συµβούλιο 
Επικρατείας (Council of the State) and the Italian Consiglio di Stato.9 
The main legal basis for the introduction of a third type of courts, apart from the 
civil and criminal, in all three selected countries lies with the basic constitutional princi-
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ple of the separation of powers. The principle signifies that ordinary courts are not com-
petent to hear disputes of an administrative character.10 A contrary solution would lead 
to the unacceptable situation of the judiciary controlling the legislature and the execu-
tive. This would be a breach of the doctrine of the separation of judiciary, executive and 
legislature as the three distinctive functions of a modern democratic state.11 It is impor-
tant to note that the principle of the separation of powers and the consequent doctrine of 
the independent judiciary constitute a legal argument which justifies, rather than abol-
ishes, judicial control of the administration. In order to secure obedience to the law from 
both the administration and the judiciary, the Constitutions of all three countries intro-
duce judicial control over the legality of administrative acts. In view of the principle of 
the separation of powers, this judicial control is undertaken by the administrative 
courts.12 
As a general rule, therefore, the judicial control of acts of the legislature and the 
administration (including the government) in all three selected countries is conducted by 
the administrative courts. However, in order to determine with further precision the na-
tional courts with the competence to judge on  breaches of EC law by the state, it is nec-
essary to establish the type of liability incurred. This can only be achieved through the 
identification of the main possible case scenarios which may be presented before the 
national judges by natural or legal persons seeking compensation for damages suffered 
as a result of breaches of EC law by the state. These possible case scenarios can be di-
vided into two wide categories, namely breaches resulting from national legislative 
measures, and, perhaps more frequently, acts or omissions of the administration, which 
breach primary and secondary EC legislation.13 
In the first type of violations, individuals suffer damages as a result of a national 
binding legislative text, which brings in a legislative measure introduced in a discrimi-
natory manner. Examples of such breaches of EC law include the restrictive national 
laws on tourist guides in all three states, the law on commercial agents in Italy and 
France, and the Greek laws which restrict the export of capital. In this type of breach the 
mere existence of an illegal national legislative text suffices, as long as the law is still in 
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force. The individual suffering damages due to this legislation will turn against the na-
tional legislature for its failure to comply with its obligation to abolish all measures in 
clash with EC law and to refrain from introducing new illegal legislative texts. 
In the second -- most frequent -- type of violations, the individual will turn 
against the administrative authorities of the state, who restrict the enjoyment of EU 
rights awarded to them under EC law in a discriminatory manner through prohibiting 
administrative acts. In this second type of violations, the existence of a discriminatory 
legislative framework does not suffice. The individual must have tried to ensure enjoy-
ment of their rights and the necessary permission or relevant facilitation must have been 
denied. In this case, the illegality of the state’s treatment lies in a particular administra-
tive act that is contrary to EC law, even though it may be legal under national law. For 
example, in the case of the restrictive Greek law on private schools, a person must have 
applied to the Minister of Education for establishment permission in Greece and that 
application must have been rejected on the basis of the applicant’s nationality. Omis-
sions of the state may also constitute sources of state liability. The state’s omission to 
consider the person’s application for establishment or trade activity permission within 
reasonable time, its omission to proceed to necessary internal operations, or even its 
forestalling to proceed to material acts necessary for the completion of the requested 
task may constitute the basis of a claim for compensation by the state.14 
From this analysis it is clear that the same national laws may constitute the 
source of compensation under both types of violations. However, in the first type it is 
the illegality of the legislative regime which constitutes the basis of the individual’s 
claim, whereas in the second case the basis of the claim is a concrete illegal administra-
tive act issued on the basis of this illegal legislative regime. Although in both situations 
the state is clearly at wrong, it must be admitted that it is in the second type of violation 
where the case of the individual is stronger, at least in practice. This is due to four main 
facts. First, the individual will be turning against a published act and not a general legal 
regime whose interpretation and application in practice can be debated by the state. 
Second, the act is issued by a concrete organ of the state (basically the respective Minis-
ter), which can be identified beyond doubt and easily called to the stand to clarify the 
state’s position. Third, the administrative act in question will inevitably include the jus-
tification of the state’s refusal to allow the establishment or pursuance of activity of the 
foreign applicant. This justification is indicative of the reasoning of the state and will 
guide both the applicant and, ultimately the court, in the evaluation of the arguments of 
 5
the state and the legality of its policy. Fourth, it is fair to say that the liability of the state 
for legislative acts is a very recent doctrine mainly introduced through the recent case-
law of the ECJ. As will be demonstrated in this paper, in the three selected countries, 




In France and Greece, disputes involving ‘the administration of the state’ are brought 
before the administrative, rather than the ordinary courts.15 Disputes are defined as is-
sues on which there is legal doubt, which are presented before the court for resolution.16 
In an attempt to clarify the complex distinction between disputes falling within the ju-
risdiction of the administrative courts and those falling within the ordinary jurisdiction, 
Cairns and McKeon state that administrative disputes are those that involve the admini-
stration in the widest possible meaning of the term. This includes ‘any administrative 
unit, be it the state itself or the smallest local authority.’17 Katras defines administrative 
disputes as those involving a legal debate between the state and the citizen.18 The crite-
rion of the public legal personality of one of the plaintiffs is used by Spiliotopoulos, 
who defines administrative liability as the liability of public legal persons.19 This crite-
rion is reminiscent of the notion of service public as the determining factor for the clas-
sification of disputes as administrative. According to the older case-law of French and 
Greek administrative courts, all actions falling within the organization and functioning 
of general and local public services constitute administrative operations giving rise to 
administrative disputes.20 Despite its support in the case-law of the French courts, this 
criterion has been strongly criticized for its imprecision in the dividing line between 
private and public persons; inability to adapt to the complexity and diversity of contem-
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porary social and commercial transactions; and unawareness of the common aim of pri-
vate and public law rules, of introducing legal provisions that aim to protect the general 
interests of society.21 The recent introduction of private contracts in the functioning of 
traditional public services and the increasing state commercial and industrial activity 
has led to a wide recognition of the fact that the notion of public service is no longer a 
suitable criterion for the determination of the competent court.22 The currently prevail-
ing criterion for the distinction between ordinary and administrative competence lies 
therefore with the nature of the provisions applicable in each case,23 or -- expressed in a 
different manner -- with the existence of an administrative activity as the source of the 
dispute.24  If the activity at the source of the dispute is of a private nature, then the ac-
tions of the administration fall within the scope of private disputes and are judged on the 
basis of civil law by the ordinary courts.25 If, however, the administration acts within its 
competence of public power, the provisions of administrative law are applicable and 
any dispute must be brought before the administrative courts.26 Thus, as Dickson notes, 
administrative courts judge disputes ‘concerned with relationships in public law, or 
which relate to situations or powers which are different from those involving private 
individuals.’27 
 In the case of the disputes of interest in this analysis, there is little doubt that it is 
the administrative courts that have the competence to hear the case. It is obvious that the 
state uses public power when passing a national law or issuing an administrative act re-
jecting the application of the individual.28 Moreover, the interpretation of the Treaties 
and the compatibility of French law with the provisions of EC legislation fall within the 
                                                 
21 See C. Dadomo and S. Faran, op.cit., p.22. 
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Sté Commercile de l’Ouest africain, Gr. Ar., no 40; C.E., 28 juin 1963, Narcy, R.D.P., 1963, p.1188; 
C.E., 22 nov. 1974, Fédération des industries du sport, J.C.P., 1975, I, NO 2724; C.E., 23 janv. 1953, 
Audoin, J.C.P., 1954, II, no 7916, note Vedel; C.E., 13 juillet 1967, Allegretto, A.J., 1967, p.538; T.C., 26 
mai 1954, Moritz, J.C.P., 1954, II, no 8334, note Vedel; C.E., 5 fév. 1954, El Hamidia, J.C.P., 1954, ii, 
NO 8136; T.C., 10 juillet 1965, Sté Bourgogne-Bois, Rec., p.586; C.E., 13 octobre 1973, A.D.A.S.E.A. du 
Rhône, D., 1979, p.249, note Amselek et Waline.  
23 See J. Rivero and J. Waline, Droit administratif (1994, Dalloz, Paris), p.146; also see AE∆ 5, 6, 8, 9 
AE∆, ∆∆, 1989, 779; Athens Three-member Administrative Court of First Instance 15222/90, ∆∆, 1991, 
1067. 
24 See P. Georges, op.cit., p.254; also see G. Mitsopoulos, Civil Procedure A’ (1972, Sakkoulas, Ath-
ens), p.105. 
25 See C.E., 5 fév. 1954, El Hamidia, Rec., p.77; T.C., 15 janv. 1968, Air-France c. Epoux Barbier, 
R.D.P., 1968, p.393; T.C., 22 janv. 1921, Bac D’ Eloka, Gr. Ar., no 40; C.E., 21 avril 1962, Dame Agnesi, 
D. 1962, p.535; also see AΠ 132/79, ToΣ, 1986, 177. 
26 See P. Dagtoglou, 1994, op.cit., p.112. 
27 See B. Dickson, Introduction to French Law (1994, Pitman Publishing, London), p.30. 
28 See M. Jarvis, The Application of EC Law by National Courts: The Free Movement of Goods (1998, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford), pp.398-399; also see C.E., 23 mars 1984, Alivar, Rec. Lebon, 1984, p.127, 
RTDE
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competence of the administrative judge.29 As Dantonel-Cor puts it, it is the task of the 
administrative judge to ensure that EC normative texts are applied in France.30 The 
question is whether the French administrative courts can also hear claims for compensa-
tion or whether their competence is limited to applications for annulment of illegal ad-
ministrative acts or declarations of illegality of normative legislative texts. The widely 
accepted position is that although companies are expected to attack the validity of the 
legislative provision grounding the administrative decision in the individual case,31 even 
simple claims for compensation against the legislature or the administrative authorities 
of the state are heard before the administrative courts. A contrary solution would ‘un-
dermine the separation of administrative and judicial authorities.’32 In any case, claims 
for compensation for damages resulting from legislative texts in breach of EC law have 
been considered admissible by administrative courts.33 Similarly admissible by adminis-
trative courts are claims for compensation for wrongful administrative acts.34 
 In Greece, the determination of the courts with the jurisdiction to judge on such 
claims for compensation against the state was expressly introduced by Law 1406/1983, 
which was based on the general provisions of Arts.94 and 95 of the Constitution of 
1975/86. According to these provisions, which were re-affirmed by Arts. 1, 2 and 71 of 
the Greek Code of Administrative Procedure, administrative disputes (and only admin-
istrative disputes)35 are heard exclusively before the administrative courts.36 Claims for 
state liability are disputes falling within the competence of the ordinary administrative 
courts that have jurisdiction in matters of plein contientieux, that is, of claims for com-
pensation.37 One type of relevant claims is requests for compensation based on the ‘non 
passing of legislative or administrative provisions for the complete adaptation of Greek 
                                                 
29 See C.E., 29 juin 1990, GISTI, unreported; also see B. Stirn, “Le Conseil d’Etat et le droit commun-
autaire, 49 (1993) Actualité Juridique: Droit Administratif, pp.244-246, at 244; for the negative response 
of the Conseil d’Etat on this matter until 1989, see N. Brown and J. Bell, French Administrative Law 
(1998, Clarendon Press, Oxford), pp.284-286.  
30 See N. Dantonel-Cor, “La mise en jour de la responsabilité de l’Etat français pour violation du droit 
communautaire” 31 [1995] RTDE, pp.471-507, at 472. 
31 See N. Brown and J. Bell, op.cit., p.286. 
32 See P. Georges, Droit public: Concours administratifs (1992, Sirey, Paris), p.349.  
33 See, for example, Cour administrative d’appel de Paris (form. plen.), 1 juillet 1992, Sté Jacques 
Dangeville, AJ, 1992, p.768.  
34 See, for example, CE, 28 fév.1992, AJ, 1992, p.210. 
35 Civil disputes may not be added to the jurisdiction of administrative courts, not even by law. See 
AE∆ 1/91, Ελλ∆νη, 1991, 1480; OλΑΠ 490/82 NoB, 1982, 204; OλΑΠ 488/82, Ελλ∆νη, 1982, 29. 
36 See AΠ 595/85, Ελλ∆νη, 1985, 300. 
37 See Athens Court of Appeal 1878/88, Ελλ∆νη, 1988, 349; Athens Court of Appeal 13605/88, 
Ελλ∆νη, 1988, 361; Athens Tri-member Court of First Instance 860/88, ∆ι∆ικ, 1, 122; Athens Court of 
Appeal 7711/87, Ελλ∆νη, 1987, 329; Athens Administrative Court of Appeal 1711/89, ∆ι∆ικ, 1, 1362. 
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law with EC legislation.’38 Such claims may be heard by the administrative courts dur-
ing the trial for the annulment of the illegal administrative act or the declaration of the 
illegality of the law.39 
 The Italian position on this issue is different. The determination of the courts 
that can adjudicate in the cases of the breaches of EC law examined in this thesis is 
based on the distinction between subjective rights and legitimate interests. Disputes de-
riving from subjective rights are brought before civil courts, and disputes deriving from 
legitimate interests are judged by administrative courts.40 The French and Greek crite-
rion of the nature of the applicable provisions is irrelevant in Italy. Thus, even in admin-
istrative disputes, the ordinary courts adjudicate over subjective rights.41 Despite the 
crucial importance of the distinction between the concepts of legitimate interests and 
subjective rights for the application of Italian law, they have not been adequately inter-
preted by the Italian courts.42 Doctrine suggests that for the establishment of a subjective 
right, the existence of a general legitimate interest is inadequate: what is required is not 
only the illegitimacy and inappropriateness of the act or fact, but the acceptance that ‘a 
perfect and entrusted subjective right has been harmed.’43 Doctrine also accepts that the 
jurisdiction of ordinary courts in disputes deriving from acts of the state is limited to the 
examination of the effects of the act on the applicant, which may not extend to the revo-
cation or modification of the act.44 
 In the case of disputes deriving from refusals of requests for authorizations in 
Italy, the subject matter is not the right itself but the exercise of the right. The latter 
gives rise to subjective rights which fall within the jurisdiction of ordinary judges.45 
Similarly, disputes deriving from non-discretional registration in professional organiza-
                                                 
38 See S. Koukouli-Spiliotopoulou, “Issues arising from the effect of Community legislation to the pro-
vision of  judicial protection” [1992] NoB, pp.825-847, at 845. 
39 See Art.26 of Presidential Decree 341/78, ΦΕΚ 71/10.5.1978, as codified in Art.124 (1) Code of Ad-
ministrative Procedure; also see A. Liagas, “General introduction on the competence of administrative 
courts” in A. Liagas, V. Skouris and A. Sofialidis, Delimitation of the Competence of Civil and Adminis-
trative Courts (1990, Sakkoulas, Thessaloniki), pp.5-25, at 17; ΣτΕ 4052/1985, ∆∆, 1986, 180. 
40 See G. Manca, A. Corrao and L. Longo, “Italy” in M. Sheridan and J. Cameron, EC Legal Systems: 
An Introductory Guide (1992, Butterworths, London/Dublin/Edinburgh/Brussels), p.Italy-23; also see L. 
Certoma, The Italian Legal System (1985, Butterworths, London), p.251; Cass. sez. un., 1 ottobre 1982, 
n.5030, Giust. civ., 1982, I, 2916; Cassazione 18 novembre 1977, n.5042, Giust. civ., 1978, I, 19; Cass. 15 
novembre 1983, n. 6767, Foro it., 1984, I, 1009; Cass. 15 ottobre 1980, n.5456, Foro it., 1981, I, 2530; 
Cass. 14 ottobre 1972, n.3060, unreported. 
41 See T. Watkin, The Italian Legal Tradition (1997, Ashgate/Dartmouth, Aldershot/Brookfield 
USA/Singapore/ Sydney), p.151. 
42 See La C. cost., 25 marzo 1980, n.35, Foro it., 1980, I, 889 
43 See G. Landi and G. Potenza, op.cit., p.330. 
44 See M. Severo Giannini and A. Piras, “Giurisdizione amministrativa” in Enciclopedia del diritto 
(1970, Giuffrè, Milano), pp.229-294, at 270. 
45 See, ibid, p.276. 
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tions as a condition for permission to trade in Italy are adjudicated by the ordinary 
courts.46 However, an action for mere annulment of the administrative act turns against 
its legitimacy. It attacks the legitimate interest to the right, which is a matter for the ad-
ministrative courts.47 
 This observation is not too dissimilar to the conclusion reached in the analysis of 
the French and Greek positions. In all three countries, only administrative judges may 
judge on the legality of administrative or legislative acts. However, there is one signifi-
cant difference. In France and Greece the applicants will submit their claim for compen-
sation to the administrative judge who also has the competence to award damages. Ital-
ian law, however, has to take into account the persistent case-law of the Corte Suprema 
di Cassazione, which accepts civil liability of the administration only if a legitimate in-
terest has been found to be injured.48 Thus, for the establishment of civil liability, the 
applicant will have to prove as a conditio sine qua non49 harm to a legitimate interest. 
As this can only be declared before the administrative courts, there seems to be only one 
legal route for the applicant: first to attack the act before the administrative courts and 
then to seek compensation for damages before the ordinary civil courts.50 This has led 
Benvenuti to state that, quite simply, the existence of subjective rights signifies the lack 
of a valid administrative act, and the existence of an administrative or legislative act ex-
cludes any ground for recourse before the ordinary courts.51 Similarly, many authors 
note that a claim for compensation pre-supposes the annulment of the act giving rise to 
the dispute.52 This position reflects the change in the case-law of the Corte di Cassazi-
                                                 
46 See Cons. St., sez. IV, 11 maggio 1966, n. 370, Cons. St., 1966, 928. 
47 See Cass. civ., 9 giugno 1995, n. 6542, Responsabilità civile e previdenza 60 (1995), pp.710-712, at 
711; also see Cass., 4 marzo 1985, n.1808; Tribunale Roma, 20 marzo 1987, Foro am., 1987, 3540; also 
see N. Brown and J. Bell, op.cit., p.273. 
48 See G. Landi and G. Potenza, Manuale di diritto amministrativo (1990, Giuffrè, Milano), p.330. 
49 See Cass., 5 ottobre 1979, n.5145; also see Cass., 5 ottobre 1979, n.5146; F. Satta, “Responsabilità 
della pubblica amministrazione” in Enciclopedia del diritto (1988, Giuffrè, Milano), pp.1369-1381, 
at1374. 
50 See Cass., sez.un., 22 ottobre 1984, n.5361, Foro it., 1985, I, 2358; Cass., 6 aprile 1983, n.2443, 
Foro it., 1983, I, 2498; Cass., 1 ottobre 1982, n.5027, Foro it., 1982, I, 2433; Cass., 16 luglio 1985, n. 
4151, Foro it., 1986, I, 2206; also see V. Caianiello, “Il giudice amministrativo ed i nuovi criteri di riparto 
delle giurisdizioni” 74 [1998] Foro amministrativo, pp.1943-1955, at 1946; also see Trib. di Roma, 23 
settembre 1987, Giust. civ., 1988, 785, which states that the prohibition to open a pharmacy is a mere 
interresso legitimo and cannot give rise to claims for compensation until the relevant subjective right is 
born through the annulment of the act. 
51 See F. Benvenuti, “Giustizia amministrativa”, Enciclopedia di diritto (1970, Giuffrè, Milano), pp. 
588-612, at 602; however, see contra Corte cost., 8 maggio 1998, n.165, Giur.it., 1998, 1929. 
52 See A. Toscano, “La responsabilità civile della p.a.”, 38 (1988) Giustizia civile, pp.1042-1045, at 
1042-1043; G. Zanobini, Corso di diritto amministrativo (1958, Giuffrè, Milano), p.339; also see Trib. 
Roma, sez. I, 30 giugno 1987, Giust. civ., 1988, 1041.  
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one, which no longer accepts the evaluation of the legality of an act by the civil court as 
a preliminary issue, or the simple non-application of the act by the civil judge.53 
 In the particular case of claims for compensation against the Italian state for its 
failure to comply with its EU obligations, the Corte di Cassazione has held that claims 
based on any legislative or administrative act that leave even the smallest margin of dis-
cretion to the state give rise to legitimate interests which are protected, at least in the 
first place, by the administrative courts. Discretion to the state may refer either to the 
evaluation of the fulfilment of certain generically introduced conditions or to the deter-
mination of compliance with national acts. These legitimate interests give rise to subjec-
tive rights, for which compensation may be sought only after the annulment of the rele-
vant legislative or administrative measure.54 Claims based on legislative or administra-
tive measures, which leave absolutely no ground for discretion to the state, give rise to 
subjective rights that are directly adjudicated by the civil courts.55 In any case, violations 
of EC law constitute the source of civil liability of the state and are mainly heard by the 
administrative courts.56 The latter may take into account judgments of the ECJ declaring 
that the relevant legislative or administrative practises are in breach of EC law. 
 This brief reference to the problem of the determination of the court with the ju-
risdiction to judge on claims of foreign secondary establishments against the French, 
Greek and Italian states has led to the conclusion that in all three states, claims for com-
pensation against the state for breaches of EC law fall mainly within the competence of 
the administrative courts. The situation is quite clear in Greece, where the issue is re-
solved by the express provision of Law 1406/83, as amended by Arts.1, 2 and 71 of the 
new Code of Administrative Procedure, which subjects all claims for compensation 
against the state to the administrative courts. This provision is successful in creating a 
situation of legal certainty for individuals. In France, the position seems to be equally 
clear. Indeed, the French legislator has attempted -- and to a certain degree has managed 
-- to clarify the French position through the Law of 16-24 August 1790 in combination 
with a series of judgments by the French courts. It must be accepted, however, that the 
                                                 
53 See Cass. civ., 9 giugno 1995, n. 6542, Responsabilità civile e previdenza 60 (1995), pp.710-712, 
which signalled a departure from the then prevailing view reflected in Cass. civ., Sez. un., 22 ottobre 
1984, n.5361, Resp. civ. prev., 1985, 625. The latter decision referred to the case where the illegitimacy of 
the act leads to its non-application by the civil court. For an analysis of the older position, see M. Cerrato, 
“Il giudice amministrativo e le direttive comunitarie” 70 [1994] Foro amministrativo, pp.2010-2049, at 
2026. 
54 See Cass., sez. un., 18 giugno 1981, n.3967, Giust. civ., 1981, 2217. 
55 See C.S., 26 aprile 1977, n.1561; sent. 15 ottobre 1975, n.3334; sent. 18 settembre 1970, n.1572. 
56 See Cons. St., Sez. V, 4 novembre 1991, Foro am., 1994, II, 1257; Sez. IV, 18 gennaio 1996, n.54, 
Giust. civ., 1996, 1191; Sez. II, 19 giugno 1991, n.570, Foro it., 1994, III, 66; TAR Sardinia, 22 dicembre 
1994, n.2204, TAR, 1995, I, 944; TAR Calabria, 19 dicembre 1989, n. 502, Riv. dei appalti, 1990, 133.  
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general terms in which this ancient law is expressed in combination with the lack of a 
strict doctrine of precedent in French law poses some uncertainty over the exact distinc-
tion between the ordinary and administrative competence in each particular case. This 
has led to the criticism, albeit mild, of the French system for lack of specific provisions, 
which would delimit the two competencies beyond dispute.57  
 Unfortunately, the Italian system is even less clear. In fact, the complex and 
fluid distinction between legitimate interests and subjective rights has been severely 
criticized for abolition of all commercial stability and legal certainty, for limitation to 
the access of individuals to compensation and for the “typically Italian discourtesy” of 
its encouragement of subsequent trials between the administrative and the civil courts 
for the final achievement of compensation.58 Some authors support the view that this 
criterion should be abandoned in favour of “a clearer distinction on the basis of con-
tent”, if only as a sign of the Italian willingness to contribute to the harmonisation of 
administrative laws within the EU.59 Another point of criticism refers to the consequent 
subjective criterion for the classification of acts and disputes,60 which may only lead to 
further confusion on the choice of the competent courts.61 A third point of concern refers 
to the introduction of a dual jurisdiction. It is felt that the complex rules about the com-
petence of the courts to judge claims for compensation create difficulty and confusion 
as to the court with the competence to hear each dispute.62 Moreover, due to the lack of 
a strict doctrine of precedent in civil law jurisdictions, the judgments of the administra-
tive courts seem to be of intermediary rather than final value for the civil judge, who 
may decide to apply or merely consult them for the final formation of a judgment.63 
 When analyzed with reference to claims for compensation for state liability, the 
Italian position creates two additional points of unease. The first point concerns the need 
for the applicants to establish the non-compliance of the act or law giving rise to state 
liability before the claim for compensation is heard. Since many breaches of EC law 
never reach the ECJ while many ECJ judgments rest in the declaration of breach of 
merely one relevant EC provision, it seems that applicants will often have to undergo 
the additional burden of proving non-compliance with the provision that is most rele-
                                                 
57 See P. Georges, op.cit., p.248. 
58 See V. Caianiello, op.cit., pp. 1946 and 1948. 
59 See L. Bocchi, op.cit., p.290; for reference to doctrine supporting this view see ibid, note 8. 
60 See G. Landi and G. Potenza, op.cit., p.224. 
61 See B. Spampinato, “Sull’estensione della giurisdizione amministrativa agli atti del privato conces-
sionario”, 73 [1997] Foro amministrativo, pp.977-998, at 977. 
62 See E. Reggio d’Aci, “Verso una giustizia amministrativa sostanziale?”, 66 [1990] Foro amministra-
tivo, pp.2515-2531, at 2526. 
63 See H. Simon, Il comportamento amministrativo (1979, Bologna), p.106. 
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vant to each case. This will inevitably take place before the national courts under the 
procedure of preliminary rulings, whose effectiveness is under debate.64 This is even 
more significant, if the need for two separate actions before two different national courts 
is taken into account. Thus, the second point of concern refers to the possible ineffec-
tiveness of the protection offered to EU citizens by a system which refers them to two 
different national judges, who may lack in knowledge and willingness to identify the 
issue as one of EC law, or to recognize the necessity to apply EC rather than national 
legal provisions.65  
 
The choice of the suitable remedy before the national courts 
 
In the three selected jurisdictions, the first forum for the hearing of cases of breaches of 
EC law by the state is the administrative courts.66 In order to achieve a full examination 
of all aspects of the case, including an evaluation of the legality of the measure giving 
rise to the alleged liability and the claim for compensation, the applicant will make use 
of the French unrestricted action (contentieux de pleine jurisdiction) or the similar 
Greek prosfygi brought on any possible ground of law or fact for the assessment of ac-
tions in tort against the state (contentieux de la responsabilité).67 This action takes into 
account the whole administrative or legislative activity, not only under the profile of 
legitimacy, but also the evaluation of fact and merit.68 In other words, the power 
awarded to the administrative judge in this type of action is far more extensive com-
pared to actions for mere annulment: the judge is asked to acknowledge the existence of 
a right, to declare an illegal harm to this right and to rectify this situation.69 Within this 
last framework, the judge may even amend the illegal act.70 The action is open to the 
                                                 
64 See M. Chiti, “I signori del diritto comunitario: la corte di giustizia e lo sviluppo del diritto amminis-
trativo europeo”, 41 [1991] Rivista trimestriale di diritto pubblico, pp.798-831, at 821-822. 
65 See Trib. Parma, 23 avrile 1994, Foro it., 1994, I, 2526, which stated that the non-implementation of 
a directive does not need to be declared by the ECJ, but national courts must ascertain whether a situation 
of non-compliance with EC law exists.  
66 Since the aim of this paper is to evaluate the judicial protection offered to companies in the three se-
lected countries administrative remedies heard internally by administrative organs are outside the scope of 
this analysis and will not be referred to here. For administrative remedies in France and Italy, see M. 
Protio, “La riforma del contentieux administratif” 72 [1996] Foro amministrativo, pp.2117-2162;also see 
B. Pacteau, Contientieux administratif (1997, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris). 
67 See W. Cairns and R. McKeon, op.cit., pp142-143; also see P. Dagtoglou, 1994, op.cit., p.479; N. 
Soleidakis, Application for Compensation (1998, Nomiki Vivliothiki, Athens). 
68 See G. Landie and G. Potenza, op.cit., p.674; also see N. Brown and J. Bell, op.cit., p.277. 
69 See J. Rivero and J. Waline, op.cit., p.181. 
70 See C. Dadomo and S. Farran, op.cit., p.224; also see P. Dagtoglou, 1994, op.cit., p.465. 
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beneficiaries of the legal right whose damage is claimed, or their legal successors,71 and 
it is only these persons who are legally bound by the court’s judgment.72 With this type 
of action, the applicant may seek both the annulment of the act and compensation for 
damages suffered.73 This joint action is of particular use to applicants who may have 
suffered damages in the past as a result of breaches of EC law by the Greek and French 
national authorities, but who still wish to pursue their activities in these countries in the 
future. In this case, the applicants’ action before the courts will both achieve compensa-
tion for damages suffered in the past, as well as ensure the future observance of their 
legal rights by the national authorities. 
 In Italy, however, such a wide examination of a case is impossible. In the first, 
administrative stage of the action, the applicant has to seek annulment of the act that 
caused the alleged damage. In order to achieve this, the applicant must establish legiti-
matio ad causam, interest to act and legitimatio ad processum.74 In other words, the 
judge needs to be satisfied that the subject of the remedy falls within the jurisdiction of 
the administrative courts,75 the applicant has a personal, direct, actual and concrete in-
terest in attacking the act whose annulment is sought,76 and they can participate in a trial 
before an Italian court.77 The applicant will also have to prove the illegitimacy of the act 
under attack on the basis of one of the restrictively introduced grounds of incompetence 
-- excess of power or violation of law.78 If all these conditions are fulfilled, the adminis-
trative judge annuls the measure and either refers it back to the competent authority in 
case of incompetence, or annuls the measure in whole or part in cases of excess of 
power and violation of law.79 
 The Italian position on the issue of remedies for state liability due to violations 
of EC law is quite restrictive in comparison with the relevant Greek and French provi-
                                                 
71 See Art.24 , par.1 of the Greek Presidential Decree 341/78, ΦEK 71 A’/10.5.1978 in combination 
with Art.4 of Law 1406/83, ΦEK 182 A’/14.12.1983; as codified by Art.71 CAP. 
72 See Art.57 of the Greek Presidential Decree 341/78, ΦEK 71 A’/10.5.1978, as codified by Art.197(3) 
of the new CAP. In contrast, the effect of an ultra vires action apply erga omnes. See W. Cairns and R. 
McKeon, op.cit., p.143. 
73 See J. Rivero and J. Waline, op.cit., p.181; also see Art.26 of the Greek Presidential Decree 341/78, 
ΦEK 71 A’/10.5.1978; Art.2, par.3 of Law 1649/1986, ΦEK 149 A’/3.10.1986; Art.19, par.1 of Law 
1868/989, ΦEK 230, A’/10.10.89, as codified by Arts.79-80 CAP. 
74 See S. Satta, Diritto processuale civile (1981, CEDAM, Padova), p.132. 
75 See C. S., sez. IV, 29 aprile 1980, n. 473; C. S., ad. plen., 19 ottobre 1979, n. 24; Cass., 8 maggio 
1978, n. 2208, TAR. Em. Rom., 26 gennaio 1977, n. 28. 
76 See C. S., sez. V, 28 febbraio 1975, n.233; TAR. Cal., 7 aprile 1975, n. 16; TAR. Lazio, sez. II, 17 
dicembre 1975, n.575. 
77 See E. Picozza, “Processo amministrativo” in Enciclopedia del diritto (1987, Giuffrè, Milano), 
pp.463-519, at 474. 
78 See T. Watkin, op.cit., p.153. 
79 See L. Certoma, op.cit., p.259. 
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sions. The most obvious constraints for the applicants’ access to justice refer to the de-
limitation of the circle of persons that may attack an illegitimate act. Although similar 
procedural restrictions are introduced by the French and Greek laws, these refer to the 
procedural ability of the applicant to be heard by the national courts, rather than to the 
quality of the right allegedly harmed by the act. An even more significant constraint 
concerns the delimitation of the grounds under which the application for annulment can 
be achieved. A consequent constraint refers to the extent of examination afforded by the 
Italian legal system with reference to the act. Although the legitimacy of the act is 
evaluated, there is no possible assessment of its merits. Similarly, there is little flexibil-
ity in the power of the administrative judge to rectify the damage caused, as there is no 
possibility of amending the act. Having said that, the decision of the Italian courts seems 
to be much stronger in legal value, as it is binding not only on the parties of the dispute, 
but erga omnes. This point is of particular significance to the three selected civil law 
jurisdictions, where -- at least in theory -- there is no obligation to follow precedents of 
other courts, especially those of different competence. 
 
The evolution of the case before the national courts 
 
In France and Greece, the hearing of the case in the first instance takes place before the 
French Administrative Court of First Instance and the Greek Tri-member Administra-
tive Court of First Instance of the region where the wrongful administrative act was is-
sued or where the head office of the administrative authority which omitted to issue the 
wrongful administrative act is based.80 After the French reform of 1987, judgments of 
the administrative courts of first instance are subject to appeal before the Cour adminis-
trative d’appel of the region where the court issuing the judgment in the first instance is 
located.81 The first instance judgment is subject to appeal before the Administrative 
Court of Appeal,82 in the region of which sat the Administrative Court of First Instance 
that decided the case in the first instance. It would be a good idea to revise the above 
sentence because the use of ‘which’ twice makes it slightly confusing. The appeal can 
                                                 
80 See Art.7, par.6 in combination with par.5 of Law 702/1977, ΦEK 268, A’/19.9.1977, and Art.2, 
par.1 and Art.3, par.1 of Presidential Decree 341/1978, ΦEK 71, A’/10.5.1978, as codified by Arts.6 and 
7 CAP.   
81 See the Law of 31 December 1987, as codified by Art.7(4) CAP; also see C.E., 12 juillet 1969, 
L’Etang, Rec. Lebon, 388; J. Rivero and J. Waline, op.cit., p.161. 
82 See Art.8, par.2 of Law 702/1977, ΦEK 268, A’/19.9.1977; Art.2, par.2 and Art.66, par.1 of Presi-
dential Decree 341/1987, ΦEK 71, A’/10.5.1978, as codified in Art.6(6) CAP. 
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be based on any ground of law or fact,83 as long as the relevant argument is concrete and 
precise,84 and has been put forward by the appellant.85 The court judging the appeal may 
quash, in part or in whole, or modify the judgment under appeal.86 Moreover, the court 
of appeal may nullify or modify the administrative act under attack for any reason, irre-
spective of whether it has been put forward by the appellant or not.87 The applicant may 
seek the cassation (anairesi or cassation) of the decision of the Court of Appeal88 before 
the Greek or French Council of the State for matters of law only.89 Admissible grounds 
of cassation are excess of power of the court whose judgment is under cassation, wrong-
ful or illegal membership of the court, wrongful interpretation or application of law, 
violation of procedural law, and existence of two conflicting judgments on the same 
case.90 Cassation on the basis of wrongful evaluation of facts,91 errors concerning facts,92 
wrongful interpretation of the documents submitted as means of proof,93 or violation of 
a non-binding internal administrative document has been unsuccessful before the Greek 
Council of the State.94 The latter may reject the application or accept it, and quash the 
judgment under attack in part or in whole. In Greece, the result of a successful cassation 
is the return of the case to the court of first instance,95 which is legally bound to follow 
the decision of the Council of the State.96 In France, however, the Conseil may either 
refer the case back to the court whose decision it decides to quash,  or keep it and decide 
on its substance as a court of first and final instance.97 
 The Greek and French provisions on the remedies against the liability of the 
state have proven to be very similar. The applicant has the opportunity to present the 
case in two instances, before the court of first instance and the court of appeal. Both 
                                                 
83 See Art.95 CAP. 
84 See ΣτE 1275/89, ∆∆, 1989, 1285.  
85 See ΣτE 531/89 and ΣτE 4664/84, ∆∆, 1990, 786, note Papahatjis; 75/90, ∆∆, 1990, 788; also see 
C.E., 27 juin 1919, Viallat et fils, Rec. Lebon, 561.  
86 See Art.174, par.1, ΚΦ∆; Art.75, pars.1 and 2 of Presidential Decree 341/1978, ΦEK 71, 
A’/10.5.1978, as codified in Art.98 CAP; also see C. Dadomo and S. Farran, op.cit., p.239. 
87 See ΣτE 633/75, unreported; also see P. Georges, op.cit., p.263. 
88 Decisions in the first instance are not subject to cassation even after the end of the prescription period 
for the submission of an appeal. See OλΣτE 654/93, ∆∆, 1993, 67; ΣτE 1648/93, ∆∆, 1993, 714. Also see 
CE, 7 fév. 1947, d’Aillières, G. Ar., no 68.  
89 See Art.95, par.1 b of the Constitution; see P. Dagtoglou, 1994, op.cit., p.698. For France, see C.E., 9 
juillet 1956, Trassard, p.310. 
90 See Art.56 of Presidential Decree 18/89 of 30.12.1988, ΦEK 8, A’/9.1.1989; for France see reasons 
same J. Rivero and J. Waline, op.cit., p.199.    
91 See ΣτE 2283/95, ∆∆, 1995, 618; ΣτE 2625/89, Eλλ∆, 1989, 374.     
92 See ΣτE 1955/87, NoB, 1987, 716. 
93 See I. Katras, op.cit., p.130, note 10.  
94 See ΣτE 113/96, ∆∆, 1996, 611. 
95 See OλΣτE 1470/90, ∆∆, 1990, 713; also see ΣτE 1338/93, ∆∆, 1993, 714. 
96 See ΣτE 173/90, ∆∆, 1990, 714. 
97 See J. Rivero and J. Waline, op.cit., p.199; also see P. Georges, op.cit., p.264. 
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courts decide fully on the case and may adjudicate issues of both substance and law. 
This system is quite similar to the procedure before the civil courts for private disputes. 
Equally similar is the procedure of cassation, judged before the hierarchically highest 
court, which adjudicates on matters of law only. From this brief reference to the proce-
dure before the administrative courts, it seems that applicants seeking compensation due 
to state liability suffer no additional burden in comparison with similar actions turned 
against private individuals. 
 This conclusion, however, does not take into account two areas where the state 
has maintained its privilege. First, both in Greece and in France, the submission of an 
action for appeal or cassation against the state lacks the suspending effect which is in-
troduced for similar remedies adjudicated before the civil courts.98 This means that the 
initial judgment can be executed even if an appeal or cassation is submitted. Conse-
quently, persons who have lost their application against the state in the first instance and 
are suffering damages due to a wrongful administrative or legislative act or omission 
will continue to be bound by the act and, as a result, continue to suffer additional dam-
ages while the appeal or cassation against the allegedly wrongful initial judgment comes 
to an end. This wouldn’t have been the case in claims for damages against private indi-
viduals.99 It must be noted that cassations submitted by the Greek state do have suspend-
ing effect. This provision has been strongly criticized as a breach of the principle of 
equality amongst plaintiffs.100  
Second, the prescription periods introduced for the submission of the appeal and 
cassation are much shorter in comparison to actions against private individuals heard by 
the civil courts.101 In France, the appeal and cassation must be submitted within two 
months from the day that the judgment under attack was issued.102 In contrast, in civil 
law, the limitation period begins with its notification to the plaintiff.103 In civil law, this 
prescription period may be extended to two years, when the judgment has not been 
                                                 
98 In the case of Greece, see P. Dagtoglou, 1994, op.cit., p.672 for appeals and Art.54 of Presidential 
Decree 18/89 of 30.12.1988, ΦEK 8, A’/9.1.1989; for France see J. Vincent and S. Guinchard, Procédure 
Civile (1994, Dalloz, Paris), pp.830-831; also see C. Dadomo and S. Farran, op.cit., p.239. 
99 See B. Dickson, op.cit., p.134. 
100 See Art.19 of Emergency Law 1715/1973 and Art.54 of Presidential Decree 18/1989 of 30.12.1988, 
ΦEK 8, A’/9.1.1989; also see P. Dagtoglou, 1994, op.cit., p.708. 
101 See P. Georges, op.cit., p.262; also see J. Vincent and S. Guinchard, op.cit., p.824; N. Soleidakis, 
op.cit., pp.39 and 131-132. 
102 See C. Dadomo and S. Farran, op.cit., p.239; also see C. Gabole, op.cit., p.466; C.E., 8 décembre 
1972, Ministre de l’Intérieur, D.A., 1973, 27. 
103 See Art.528 CPC; also see Cour d'Appel, civ., 2, 13 janv.1983, Gaz. Pal., 1983, 444, note du 
Rusquec. 
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served to the applicant.104 In Greece, these prescription periods are even shorter. The 
limitation period for the appeal is only one month starting from the next day after the 
notification of the judgment under attack and ending on the same day of the next 
month.105 In any case, the appeal must be submitted within one year from the publication 
of the judgment, whereas in a civil trial the relevant prescription period is three years.106 
Following once again the French model, the Greek cassation must be submitted within 
60 days starting from the notification of the judgment to the applicant or within 60 days 
starting from the date of publication of the judgment for the state.107 In both France and 
Greece, the difference in the initiating event of the prescription period is a violation of 
the principle of equality amongst plaintiffs, which -- in view of the delays in the publi-
cation of administrative judgments and the consequent longer limitation periods for the 
state -- proves to be beneficiary to the state.108 
 Without a doubt, the applicant’s claim for compensation against the state would 
benefit from a dual-grade procedure and a cassation before the highest administrative 
court. However, it would have to overcome the procedural hurdles set by the Greek and 
French law in favour of the state, namely lack of suspending effect of the judgment un-
der attack and shorter limitation periods in comparison with the relevant procedures in-
troduced for claims against private persons. 
 In Italy, the applicant’s case will be heard before the Tribunale Amministrativo 
Regionale (TAR) in the first instance.109 Under Art.25 CPC, the tribunale of the place 
where the head-office of the relevant Avvocatura dello Stato is located, has the territo-
rial competence to judge the case.110 As a general rule, the aim of the procedure before 
the TAR is to attack the legitimacy and expediency of the administrative or legislative 
measure that constitutes the source of the applicant’s damage.111 The court may annul 
the measure under attack for incompetence, excess of power or violation of law, or up-
                                                 
104 See Art.528, par.1 CPC; also see S. Guinchard, op.cit., p.290. 
105 See Art.4 of Law 1406/83, ΦEK 182 A’/14.12.1983, which refers to Art.167 of Presidential Decree 
331/85, ΦΕΚ 116, A’/31.5; also see ΣτΕ 3504/91, ∆∆, 1991, 294.  
106 See Art.5, par.2 of Law 702/1977, ΦEK 268, A’/19.9.1977 and Art.58, par.3 of Presidential Decree 
18/1989 of 30.12.1988, ΦEK 8, A’/9.1.1989. Also see Art.518, par.2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 
107 See Art.53 of Presidential Decree 18/89 of 30.12.1988, ΦEK 8, A’/9.1.1989. Also see B. Papachris-
tou, Limitation Periods for and against the State and Public Enterprises (1993, Sakkoulas, Athens), 
p.227; ΣτΕ 1084/1984, ΝοΒ, 1985, 342.  
108 See P. Dagtoglou, 1994, op.cit., p.706; also see S. Guinchard, Code de Procédure Civile (1997-
1998, Litec, Paris), p.289. 
109 See Art.6 Reg. Proc. TAR; also see Art.35 Cons. St. and 6 reg. proc. Con. St. 
110 Also see Royal Decree n.1611 of 30 October 1933; Law n. 260 of 25 March 1958; Law n. 103 of 3 
April 1979, as subsequently amended. 
111 See L. Certoma, op.cit., p.259. 
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hold it.112 The merits of the case are irrelevant.113 The judgment of the TAR is subject to 
appeal for matters of law and fact before the Consiglio di Stato within a short prescrip-
tion period of sixty days from the notification of the decision in the first instance to the 
applicant.114 Contrary to France and Greece, this period can be extended to the one year 
introduced by the relevant provision of civil procedure,115 in cases where the notification 
never took place or was undertaken in an illegal manner.116 As in Greece and France, 
however, the appeal before the Consiglio di Stato does not have suspending effect.117 
Under Art.362 CPC, the decision of the Council of the State is subject to cassation be-
fore the Corte di Cassazione for jurisdictional grounds only.118 Having succeeded in an-
nulling or modifying the administrative or legislative measure that caused damage to the 
applicant, and thus having acquired a subjective right, the applicant will bring the claim 
for compensation before the civil court. This will probably be the Tribunale, which ad-
judicates claims of above 750,000 Lire.119 Its decisions are subject to appeal on matters 
of law and fact before the Corte d’ Appello, which must be submitted within the pre-
scription period of thirty days starting from the day of the publication of the first in-
stance judgment.120 The decision on this appeal is subject to cassation before the Corte 
di Cassazione on matters of law only.121 Valid grounds for cassation include errors in 
the jurisdictional process,122 competence errors,123 violation or false application of the 
                                                 
112 See T. Watkin, op.cit., p.155. 
113 See L. Certoma, op.cit., p.258. 
114 See Art.28, par.2 of Law 1034 of 6 December 1971; also see G. Landi and G. Potenza, op.cit., 
p.800. 
115 See Art.327 CPC. 
116 See F. Benvenuti, “Processo amministrativo”, Enciclopedia del diritto (1987, Giuffrè, Milano), 
pp.454-519, at 504. 
117 See G. Landi and G. Potenza, op.cit., p.800. 
118 See Art.37 of Royal Decree no. 1443 of 28 October 1940; also see Maisto and Miscali, op.cit., 
p.370. 
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law,124 invalidity of the sentence or the procedure,125 and omission or insufficient or con-
tradictory legal basis.126   
 The Italian procedure for the achievement of compensation for state liability is 
characterized by its complexity,127 which has already been mentioned. From the analysis 
of the evolution of the case before the Italian courts, other disadvantages of the Italian 
position become obvious. First, the applicant claiming damages from the Italian state 
will have to seek the annulment of the relevant administrative or legislative measure on 
very limited grounds as compared to the relevant provisions of French and Greek law. 
Indeed, the Italian grounds for the annulment of the act are limited to excess of power, 
incompetence and breach of law. This leaves little ground for annulment on the basis of 
wrongful interpretation of the evidence produced, wrongful ignorance of evidence or 
other matters of fact. This limitation in the grounds for annulment of the relevant meas-
ures acquires particular significance in the evaluation of the protection offered under the 
Italian provisions, if one takes into account that failure of the applicant to establish a 
valid reason for the annulment of the act signifies lack of a subjective right, which in 
turn means lack of opportunity to achieve compensation. Second, in Italy, the cassation 
in the administrative trial, allowed on matters of law only before the French and Greek 
Council of the State, is limited to purely jurisdictional issues. This withholds the appli-
cant’s right to a two-grade trial with the opportunity for a cassation on matters of law, 
which would normally be the case in claims for compensation against private individu-
als in the civil procedure. Third, as is also the case in France and Greece, the decisions 
of the Italian administrative courts lack suspending effect, a fact which disadvantages 
the applicants and favours the state.128  
 Having said that, in Italy the time-limits set for the submission of appeals and 
cassations are the same in the administrative and civil process creating no difference 
between actions for compensation against the state and private individuals.129 Moreover, 
in the Italian administrative stage of the claim for compensation, the presence of the ap-
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plicant in court to defend its recourse is not necessary.130 This signifies that the case will 
evolve even if, for any reason, the applicant does not appear before the administrative 
judge. In addition to this, the administrative judge has the power and the obligation to 
examine the validity of all grounds for annulment put forward by the applicant, but 
based on all possible arguments. This provision introduces a more in-depth examination 
of the merits on which the claim of the applicant is based. 
 From the analysis of the possible evolution of the trial before the national courts 
of the three selected jurisdictions, it becomes clear that the applicant’s claim against the 
state is more complicated and difficult compared to claims against private individuals. 
 
Enforcement and compliance 
 
Having followed the procedural aspect of the applicant’s claim for compensation 
against the state in the three selected countries and having established that claims 
against the state in all three jurisdictions tend to be burdened by special provisions in-
troduced in favour of the state, it is time to refer to an issue which is especially prob-
lematic in claims against the national authorities of these states. Perhaps the most im-
portant point of reference for the assessment of the efficiency of the protection offered 
to individuals at the national level refers to national provisions on the execution of the 
relevant judgments. In other words, for the evaluation of the level of access of appli-
cants to justice at the national level, it is important to establish that the judgment of the 
national court awarding compensation to the applicant can be efficiently used for the 
final payment of the awarded sum to the foreign public limited. 
 In Italy, final judgments of civil and administrative courts may be enforced 
against the state. The procedure of execution or enforcement of civil court judgments is 
regulated by the third Libro of the CPC. As a general remark, it would be fair to state 
that in Italy (as in most civil law countries) the aim of the judicial system is to establish 
the existence of rights rather than to enforce these rights.131 As a consequence of this 
philosophy, the execution process is initiated at the demand of the plaintiffs, who must 
acquire one of the exclusively introduced executive documents of Art.474 CPC. These 
include final judgments of the civil and administrative courts.132 The powers awarded to 
Italian judges in the area of enforcement are wide and include all means under which 
the order of the final judgment on the substance of the case can be realized. Examples of 
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such powers include an order to the administration to proceed to the realization of the 
judgment without delay, or an order to the administration to issue a new act without de-
lay, or the decision of the court to take action in lieu of the administration.133 As a rule, 
plaintiffs may seek the enforcement of previous judgments only when the state has 
failed to act in compliance with a previous final decision.134 However, actions for en-
forcement have been considered admissible even in cases of pseudo-acts or wrongful 
acts.135 Judgments on compliance are subject to appeal.136 
 In France, the enforcement of final judgments137 in the administrative process 
depends very much upon the goodwill of the administration, as there is practically no 
means of forced execution against the state.138 This is mainly based on the belief that 
there is a need for the state to enjoy certain privileges in order to serve the general good 
more effectively.139 The weakness140 of the administrative courts to force the national 
authorities to comply with their judgments is addressed via three routes: first, the right 
of the minister concerned to seek the assistance of the Conseil d’ Etat on the appropriate 
matter in which a judgment against him may be enforced; second, the possibility of a 
Conseil d’Etat initiative to point out to the administration the implication of final judg-
ments; and third, the right of the plaintiff to report difficulties of enforcement to the 
Conseil.141 Insofar as orders to payment of compensation are concerned, the state has the 
obligation to proceed with payment within four months of the publication of the judg-
ment. If the state does not conform to this obligation, the Conseil d’ Etat has the power 
to order financial penalties and a fine for each day of non-compliance.142 It must be 
noted, however, that the admittedly significant control awarded to the Conseil for the 
effectiveness of judgments against the state is clouded by the very cautious use of this 
action so far and the small number of successful actions.143 Thus, there is little doubt 
that enforcement of final administrative judgments against the French national authori-
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ties is a problematic process. This is mainly due to the lack of execution mechanisms, as 
is the case with enforcement against private individuals. The introduction of indirect 
means of coercion of the French state to comply with administrative judgments can be 
of some help to those seeking the payment of compensation for violations of EC law. 
The usual compliance of the French authorities, albeit delayed, is also a fact that must 
be taken into account in the evaluation of the effects of this provision on the access of 
EU citizens to justice at the national level.144 However, it would be unfair to say that this 
privilege of the French state does not radically and adversely affect the right of EU citi-
zens to effective judicial protection, even after the violation has been declared by the 
courts and compensation has been ordered. 
 In Greece, the provision on compliance has been modified after the introduction 
of the new Code of Administrative Procedure of July 1999. According to the pre-
existing system in Greece, as in France, there was no specific provision expressly intro-
ducing the obligation of the state to comply with the judgments of the administrative 
courts. Greek law introduced three methods of coercion for the state and its servants, so 
as to achieve compliance of the Greek authorities to the judgments of the courts. First, 
state employees who did not fulfil their duties were punished under Art.259 CrC. How-
ever, despite the undoubtful application of this provision in the case of civil servants 
who failed or omitted to comply with administrative court judgments on compensation 
for state liability, its implementation in practice was hindered by the need to prove that 
the relevant civil servants acted with intent and that their aim was either personal illegal 
gain or the provocation of harm to the state or third persons. Second, Art.205 of the 
Employer’s Code introduced disciplinary liability to employees who failed to fulfil their 
duties through wrongful acts or omissions. However, the successful action against civil 
servants who failed to comply with administrative judgments would only succeed if the 
plaintiff managed the impossible task of ignoring the collective policy of the particular 
department and managed to attribute liability to a specific person. Third, the failure or 
omission to comply with court judgments gave rise to state liability. In practice, how-
ever, the Greek authorities tended to use “inertia, stalling and silent rejection” as means 
of non-compliance.145 Thus, even these three methods were not considered capable of 
persuading the state to comply. 
 This position changed, albeit basically in theory, after the 1997 ratification of the 
1966 UN International Agreement on Personal and Political Rights by the Greek Par-
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liament.146 The Agreement, which guarantees the execution of judgments against the au-
thorities of the state, led a small number of Greek judges to recognize that forced execu-
tion was possible even against the state.147 The new Code of Administrative Procedure, 
in force since July 1999, introduces the first Greek legislative provision on the obliga-
tion of the state to comply with the judgments of the Greek administrative courts. 
Art.198 CAP regulates that administrative authorities have the obligation to comply 
with the content of judgments on disputes brought before the courts under the procedure 
of prosfygi. In cases of non-compliance, state employees who fail or omit to comply are 
punished under Art.259 of the Penal Code and are personally liable to compensate those 
injured by their actions or inaction. There is little doubt that Art.198 is a revolutionary 
provision whose introduction can be seen as a guarantee for the effective protection of 
natural and legal persons claiming compensation for damages by the Greek state. In-
deed, a guarantee of compliance by the Greek administrative authorities with the judg-
ments of the administrative courts would signify unhindered access to justice for indi-
viduals suffering damages as a result of the Greek failure to comply with EC legislation. 
The question is, whether this new provision really guarantees this compliance. The in-
terpretation of this provision by the Greek courts and its implementation by the adminis-
trative authorities in future cases will demonstrate its value. However, even without the 
benefit of adequate case-law on this new provision, there are three points of concern in 
relation to its possible benefits. First, Art.198 refers to judgments under prosfygi only. 
In the cases examined in this thesis, this signifies the state’s obligation to comply with 
the judgments of the administrative courts concerning the validity of administrative acts 
and their compliance with EC legislation. However, it seems that the state’s obligation 
to comply does not cover applications for damages suffered due to illegal acts or omis-
sions of the state. It seems therefore that there is little guarantee for the final payment of 
compensation by the Greek state. Second, the result of non-compliance is not a liability 
of the state as such, but personal criminal and civil responsibility of the state employee 
whose action or inaction is considered to be in clash with judgments of the administra-
tive courts. The value of these provisions was discussed in the analysis of the old posi-
tion on non-compliance. The criminal liability of the employee requires proof of intent 
to harm and aim of personal gain, whereas the civil liability of the employee requires 
attribution of liability to an action or inaction of a particular natural person employed in 
one of the departments dealing with the file of the injured party. Third, in view of the 
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express abolition of prior provisions on issues covered by the new Code,148 it is doubtful 
whether the disciplinary punishment of such employees -- introduced in the old system, 
but ignored in the Code -- is still valid.  
 On the basis of the analysis of the Code so far, it is fair to say that the provision 
of the new Code on compliance is a timid act of the Greek legislator, which does not 
guarantee the effective protection of EU citizens suffering damages due to the non-
compliance of the Greek authorities with EC legislation. However, a final assessment of 
the new Code would be incomplete without reference to the issue of enforcement. In the 
past, in Greece -- as in France -- there was no mechanism for the enforcement of civil, 
criminal or administrative judgments against the state and its authorities.149 This position 
was strongly criticized as a direct breach of the constitutional principle, which intro-
duces unhindered access of all citizens to justice.150 Art.199 of the new Code regulates 
that for the enforcement of judgments reached under the procedure of application for 
damages, plaintiffs must follow the enforcement procedure of the Greek Code of Civil 
Procedure. In other words, for the enforcement of judgments on compensation, appli-
cants can seize assets of the Greek state under the procedure followed in the case of sei-
zure against private individuals.151 This constitutes the ultimate weapon for the coercion 
of the Greek state into compliance with the relevant orders for the payment of compen-
sation by administrative courts. However, in view of the novelty of the provision on sei-
zure against the state, there is uncertainty over the practical application of this provi-
sion. It is difficult to imagine which assets of the Greek state will be seized and, when 
liquidated, which particular department or organ will be entitled to the excess remaining 
after the subtraction of the sum ordered by the court. Moreover, there is scope for an 
argument that the seizure of assets of the state clashes with the general principle of the 
prevalence of public interest, which in this case is the unhindered functioning of the 
Greek administrative authorities. Furthermore, there is a problem concerning the legal 
basis of the applicant’s request for the enforcement of judgments ordering compensa-
tion: as these are brought before the administrative courts under applications for dam-
ages, rather than under the procedure of prosfygi, the state has no obligation to comply. 
Since the state is not obliged to comply, it is doubtful that a seizure of assets will be 
theoretically sound and, consequently, practically allowed by the Greek judges who 
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have always exercised their right to refrain from applying a procedurally valid Greek 
law, if they consider it illegal or unconstitutional. Last but not least, this provision can 
only benefit future claims for damages and is inapplicable to orders for compensation 
already declared by the courts.152 From the analysis of the old and new regimes on the 
obligation of the Greek authorities to comply with administrative judgments and on the 
issue of enforcement, it is clear that even the new Code fails to guarantee final payment 
to applicants, even after a final judgment ordering compensation has been reached. 
 The issue of enforcement and compliance of the state with court decisions is of 
crucial importance for the evaluation of the effectiveness of the protection offered to EU 
citizens suffering damages as a result of state violations of EC law. In France and, 
seemingly still in Greece, there is little evidence that the applicants who manage to ac-
quire court orders for compensation will be able to use them and achieve payment in 
practice. The French express provision of non-enforcement against the state and the 
Greek ambiguity in the practical implementation of the new, seemingly permissive pro-
visions on enforcement, constitute a significant blow to the effectiveness of judicial pro-
tection in practice. As they limit the right to compensation, these doctrines can be 
viewed to be in direct clash with the principle of the effective protection of the individ-
ual and, consequently, can be deemed illegal under EC law. This, however, is only one 
side of the problem. The final payment of compensation may satisfy the right of appli-
cants to achieve restoration of damages suffered in the past. In both French and Greek 
law there is little, though, which could prevent future damages, as the national authori-
ties may still refuse to comply with legality through the final rectification of the admin-
istrative or legislative act constituting the source of past damages. The constant persecu-
tion of authorities or employees for compensation due to their failure to comply with 
prior court’s judgments, declaring the relevant acts illegal, is little comfort for appli-
cants whose main aim is to finally establish and pursue their economic activity within 
the Member State of their choice.  
 
B. SUBSTANTIVE CONDITIONS FOR ACHIEVEMENT OF COMPENSATION 
 
The analysis of the procedural conditions for the achievement of compensation for ap-
plicants suffering damages due to violations of EC law by the French, Italian and Greek 
authorities has demonstrated that the privileges enjoyed by the state in such disputes 
impede, to a certain extent, the applicants’ case for compensation. Even though the rele-
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vant provisions are slightly different in the three selected countries, mainly as a result of 
the Italian civil courts’ competence to award compensation against the state as opposed 
to the French and Greek unitary system of administrative justice, the content of the rele-
vant procedural provisions was found to be rather similar. Probably more so are the sub-
stantive provisions on the establishment of state liability in the three countries, which all 
follow the civil law tradition.153 In general, the conditions of liability in the three se-
lected jurisdictions are wrongful act, damage and a causal link between the first two 
elements. Since the civil law principles of liability are also applicable to state liability,154 
these elements also apply to the cases examined in this thesis. Let us examine each one 
of these elements separately.  
 
Wrongful act or omission  
 
The source of the damage must be a wrongful act or omission by the authorities of the 
state. For the purposes of establishing state liability in the three selected countries, an 
act is defined as a judicial or material activity accomplished under the rules of adminis-
trative law or an omission of such activity.155 Activity of the public administration giv-
ing rise to state liability can be acts, operations or any external expression of behav-
iour.156 Material facts include negligence, error, delay or even failure to act within the 
time-limits introduced by the laws of the state.157 Omissions are defined as violations of 
the legal obligation of national authorities to issue an act, or the ignorance of an act 
which is beneficiary to the citizen or which may prevent future damage to the citizen in 
question.158 An omission presupposes a “concrete legal obligation” to act.159 It goes 
without saying that the relevant state act must be a result of willing and conscious be-
haviour.160 The classification of the relevant act as enforceable under the national provi-
sions of procedure is irrelevant for its characterisation as a possible source of state li-
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ability.161 Even emanations of legislative acts that are “irregular and faulty” may give 
rise to state liability on the basis of the damage they may cause in the future to individu-
als against whom the relevant legislative act may be applied.162 This aspect of state li-
ability will be examined separately. In Italy, the action of the authorities must also harm 
a subjective right of the citizen. Such a subjective right may derive from the existence of 
a wrongful judicial act, an administrative regulation or a simple behaviour.163 
 The act or omission giving rise to state liability must be illegal, in other words it 
must be contra ius, namely contrary to the authority’s duty to comply with and apply 
the national laws and regulations.164 However, the law which the national authorities 
breach in each particular case must be introduced in order to benefit the citizens of the 
country. The breach of acts introduced for the exclusive protection of the general public 
interest cannot give rise to state liability.165 As a rule, state liability occurs as a result of 
unlawful acts only.166 In fact, illegality is widely considered to be a necessary pre-
requisite for the establishment of state liability. This is the currently prevailing view, 
which however is subject to possible change due to the recent development of a more 
liberal doctrine of state liability for legal acts by the ECJ.167 However, so far there is lit-
tle evidence to demonstrate that national courts are willing to accept state liability for 
legal acts. This is more so in Italy, where the illegality of the act must be declared by an 
administrative court before the subjective right, giving rise to a right to compensation, 
can be conceived.168 
 In order to establish state, rather than personal liability, the act or omission must 
have taken place within the framework of the provision of public service by the author-
ity that issues or omits to issue the act giving rise to a claim for compensation. If this is 
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the case, the state is liable for compensation and not the civil servant who acts or omits 
to act.169 This is so, because the state authority and its employers are bound by a rela-
tionship of representation or order, which signifies that the state is bound by the actions 
or omissions of its employees as long as these fall within the framework of their con-
tract of representation or order.170 Activity within the framework of their public service 
is defined as the action within the circle of the competence of their functioning, which is 
regulated by legal rules introducing the conditions of legality of their acts.171 However, 
if the civil servant acts or omits to act outside the framework of the activity undertaken 
by the department to which s/he is employed, or if the service provided to the citizen is 
in the name of the natural or legal person undertaking it on behalf of the state, the act or 
omission cannot be attributed to the state.172 This could occur when the civil servant un-
dertakes an action totally foreign to the work of the authority where s/he is employed 
with intent to achieve personal benefit.173 In any other case, liability must be attributed 
to the state as a general rule.174  
 The source of illegality of the state’s activity, or lack of, is the violation of law, 
which constitutes a sufficient element for the establishment of state liability as an objec-
tive factor. This means the citizen will not have to prove the existence of fault of the 
administration in any of the three countries examined here.175 Thus, the public admini-
stration is at wrong every time the law is broken. The theoretical justification of the 
prevalence of objective state liability lies with the impossibility in the attribution of sub-
jective fault to particular organs in complex procedures of legislative and administrative 
decision-making. It is felt, and rightly so, that the introduction of subjective fault as an 
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additional element of state liability would make its proof by the individual citizen im-
practical. It would be humanly impossible for ordinary citizens to pinpoint all the par-
ticular natural and legal persons involved in the legislative or administrative act which 
is the source of liability. It would be equally impossibly for ordinary citizens to attribute 
the exact percentages of such liability to each person involved.176 Although the end re-
sult for the applicant is the same in all three countries, namely subjective fault of the 
administration does not have to be proven for the success of the claim for compensation, 
it would not be right to state that fault is not an element of liability in France. In the 
past, the French courts did indeed declare that state liability is one of no fault.177 How-
ever, this position was battered by vocal critics who characterized it as “a disgrace” for 
the French legal system.178 Rather than a reaction to the principle of no-fault state liabil-
ity, this was the expression of adverse feelings towards the background to the decision 
of the French courts to introduce the principle in the first place. In other words, this was 
the well camouflaged attempt of French judges to avoid the examination of the prelimi-
nary issue of the legality of the act or omission.179 As a result, the position of the French 
courts has recently changed and fault, albeit not subjective, is indeed an element of state 
liability. However, fault is required in the objective sense, namely as an element which 
is fulfilled with the existence of a violation of law.180 For violations of EC law specifi-
cally, all three jurisdictions examined here now accept that the basis of liability is the 
breach itself.181 The legal basis of this doctrine is the French and Greek recognition of 
the primacy of EC law, and the Italian doctrine on the obligatorietà of EU provisions.182   
 Despite the legal basis of the national provisions on wrongful acts or omissions 
as elements of state liability in the three selected countries, the fact still remains that the 
applicant suffering damages as a result of a state violation of EC law does not have to 
prove a subjective fault by the administration. This means that the wrongfulness of the 
act or omission will be judged on the basis of its non-compliance with EC law and not 
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on the basis of alleged negligence or intent by the national authority that issued the act 
or undertook the omission. It is widely accepted that the lack of a subjective element of 
fault is a guarantee of unhindered access of the applicant to justice.183 Indeed, the intro-
duction of the mere demonstration of the existence of an EU violation as a proof of 
wrongfulness could not have been more liberal and beneficial a provision for the appli-
cant. In any case, any concept of fault going beyond illegality would clash with the EU 
doctrine of Brasserie and would therefore be an unacceptable limitation to the access of 
applicants to justice at the national level.184 
 
Damage and Causation 
 
The other two elements of state liability are damage suffered by the applicant as a result 
of the state’s violation of EC law and a causal link between wrongful act and damage. 
Since these elements of liability are regulated by the relevant doctrines of civil law, they 
will be analysed briefly. Damage is defined as any loss suffered by the citizen in his/her 
corporal or incorporeal goods, or as any reduction in the legal interests of the citizen.185 
According to a well established civil law principle applicable in the vast majority of 
civil law countries, damage is compensated only if it is certain, direct and subject to fi-
nancial evaluation.186 The damage is certain, if it is existent and actual. Having said that, 
future damage may be compensated for, as long as it can be currently evaluated and its 
realization is certain, or at least quite probable.187 As a general rule, the damage must be 
quantifiable. However, even where this is not the case, some damages will be 
awarded.188 Damages can be awarded for financial loss, moral loss and loss of chance, 
that is, loss of the opportunity to gain.189 In the last case, the chance to gain must be es-
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tablished with sufficient certainty.190 This would be the case in the loss of the chance to 
enter into a contractual agreement, or to acquire funding which would have added to the 
property of a person.191 
 Moreover, in order to succeed in its claim for compensation, the applicant must 
prove that the relevant damage is direct. In other words, the applicant must prove that 
the damage is an immediate and direct consequence of the wrongful act or omission.192 
This occurs when, under normal circumstances, the wrongful act or omission would 
lead to the damages suffered.193 Thus, the applicant seeking compensation will have to 
concentrate on two elements for the proof of causality between wrongful act and dam-
age, namely the criteria of normality and proximity. The applicant will have to prove 
that the damage is the normal consequence of the wrongful act or omission, and that 
he/she was close to the act in time, space and situation that caused harm.194 Thus, it is 
the theory of the causa adequata which is applicable in this case.195  
 In the case of individuals suffering damages as a result of the state’s violation of 
EC law, the applicant will seek compensation for losses suffered until the hearing of the 
trial and amounting to expenses incurred for the procedure necessary for the acquisition 
of state permission to establish or trade. However, the main claim of the applicant 
would be compensation for the loss of the opportunity to gain through trade within the 
state in question, or trade in a specific area of commercial activity within the state ex-
tending both before and after the hearing and until the annulment or modification of the 
wrongful act. This would amount to the profit which is normally expected to accrue in 
the ordinary course of things or by reference to specific circumstances where prepara-
tory measures have been taken.196 The positive damage incurred is obviously certain and 
quantifiable. As far as the manque de chance is concerned, it may be future loss but the 
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applicant will have little difficulty in proving that authorization from the state would 
produce gain, which they now missed. Means of proof in this direction could be the 
production of annual profit of companies dealing in similar areas of trade, or reference 
to contracts which would have been entered into if the applicant were allowed to estab-
lish within the host state. The main problem with this loss of opportunity to gain, how-
ever, lies with the evaluation of the damages suffered. Although this damage is very dif-
ficult to quantify, the applicant should expect some level of compensation from the 
courts. Furthermore, the applicant will have to establish the direct causal link between 
act and damage as introduced by the prevailing doctrine on civil and administrative li-
ability in the three selected countries, the causa adequata. In practice, this would be 
quite easy, as without the state’s prohibition to establish or trade, the applicant would 
have been allowed to make profit anyway. This brief reference to the issue of damage 
and causation demonstrates that the relevant national provisions allow a fair opportunity 




In the case of individuals suffering damages from acts of the national authorities that are 
contrary to EC law, in natura restitution is not possible. In fact, it is accepted that resti-
tution in natura cannot be requested by the state due to the principle of the separation of 
powers, which prevents the intervention of the judicial function in the executive func-
tion.197 This argument is not without legal basis. In natura restitution would involve an 
order by the competent judge to the authorities to abolish a precise act. The theoretical 
and practical problems of such interference by the judiciary in the executive have al-
ready been analysed. In any case, in natura restitution would signify reversal to the 
situation before the occurrence of the damage, that is, abolition of the administrative or 
legislative act in question. However, this form of restitution could not be considered 
complete, as it would still not rectify the applicant’s loss of the opportunity to gain.198 
Since the judge may order in natura restitution only when this type of compensation is 
not contrary to the interests of the applicant,199 this type of restitution cannot possibly be 
ordered in the case of applicants suffering damages as a result of breaches of EC law by 
national authorities. Indeed, in order to achieve full restitution, the judge in the case will 
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have to order a lump sum for the expenses incurred and the loss of opportunity until the 
date of the trial, as well as a daily rate for compensation of future damages until the ad-
ministration abolishes the wrongful act or proceeds with the act so far omitted.200 For the 
evaluation of the compensation awarded, the judge will base the judgment on the par-
ticular circumstances of the case and the detailed liquidation of losses submitted by the 
applicant.201 A daily interest may also be awarded running from the date that the damage 
occurred until the date of payment of compensation.202 
 The Greek, French and Italian provisions on restitution for damages resulting 
from state liability are a replica of the relevant provisions for compensation in private 
disputes, to which they refer anyway. The compensation awarded to applicants equals 
the amount of money by which their fortune has decreased due to the wrongful act or 
omission of the administration.203 This principle, also known as Differenztheorie, pre-
vails in all cases of compensation in the three selected jurisdictions and, being non-
discriminatory, is in full compliance with the criteria of restitution introduced by the EU 
doctrine on state liability.204 
 
Compensation for legislative acts 
 
The analysis of the substantive conditions for the establishment of state liability in 
France, Italy and Greece has demonstrated that the elements of state liability for 
breaches of EC law in the three selected countries do not set limitations to access to jus-
tice. However, although reference was made to both administrative and legislative acts 
as sources of possible damages for which compensation is sought, the issue of the rec-
ognition of state liability from legislative acts has not been explored. The acknowl-
edgement of state liability for legislative acts is a doctrine recently introduced and de-
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veloped by the ECJ after Brasserie and its subsequent judgments.205 Since EC law intro-
duces an obligation of the state to make good, damages suffered as a result of a legisla-
tive act or omission of the state, the evaluation of the level of protection offered at the 
national level would be incomplete without reference to the issue of legislative state li-
ability. 
 Such liability is not unknown to the three jurisdictions analysed here.206 State 
liability is accepted for any illegal action or omission of the national authorities. The 
legislature is a national authority whose duty is to ensure that legislative texts passed by 
it are in compliance with the Constitution and, insofar as EU citizens are concerned, the 
regulations of the EU.207 Thus, legislative acts in clash with EC law are illegal and may 
lead to compensation for damages under the general provisions on state liability.208 De-
spite the acceptance of this position in the legal theory of all three selected jurisdictions, 
state liability for legislative acts is not accepted unconditionally. In all three countries, 
legislative acts set for the protection of the general interests of the citizens of the state, 
general economic interest or social order, albeit illegal,  may not give rise to legislative 
state liability, as any subsequent damage would not be abnormal and special.209 More-
over, legislative state liability can only derive from a positive legislative action rather 
than an omission of the legislator to regulate a specific situation.210 Last but not the 
least, despite the support of the principle of legislative state liability by most Greek au-
thors, the Greek Areios Pagos (the highest civil court) refuses to recognize liability for 
legislative acts.211 Thus, in Greece state liability for legislative actions is not accepted 
and compensation for a relevant case has never been awarded. 
 Even in France and Italy, national law introduces two important restrictions. 
First, there is a limitation concerning the means with which this liability may occur. 
Contrary to one of the main general doctrines of civil and administrative law, an action 
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is required whereas an omission is not sufficient. In principle, there is little to justify 
this limitation to the rights of individuals seeking compensation for legislative state li-
ability. However, in practice the omission of the state to legislate on a particular issue 
would signify the existence of a lacuna in the relevant national legislation. For indi-
viduals wishing to benefit from EC law, this would be filled with reference to the rele-
vant principles of EC law, thus restricting their rights within the territory of the host 
state. If the latter refuses to apply the relevant EC law provisions, then liability of the 
state would occur from a precise administrative act expressing the state’s intention. In 
this case, the applicant is owed compensation on the basis of this illegal administrative 
act, rather than on the basis of the omission of the legislator to issue an act in compli-
ance with EC law. Apart from the lack of practical value of this limitation, the theoreti-
cal background of its introduction seems to be the principle of the separation of powers. 
Although judicial control of an existing law is accepted to be not only a right but also a 
duty of the judicial function of a modern state, a court order forcing the legislature to 
take a particular legislative step or, even worse, an attempt by the judiciary to create a 
legislative regime through a court judgment would be an obvious and vulgar interfer-
ence of the judiciary in the function of the legislative authorities of the state. Thus, the 
limitation of state liability to damages caused exclusively by legislative actions is justi-
fied by reference to the principle of the separation of powers. 
 A second restriction introduced in the area of legislative state liability refers to 
the nature of damages suffered by the applicant. These have to be abnormal and special, 
a result of a legislative act which was set for the protection of a particular circle of peo-
ple, rather than the general interest. Admittedly, the French Conseil d’ Etat, whose case-
law also has an indirect effect on its Italian and Greek counterparts, seems to be quite 
liberal in its interpretation of this provision.212 In any case, the effect of the legislative 
action on a specific circle of persons is an obvious expression of the German 
Schutznormtheorie, according to which the state is only liable when the interests of a 
closed circle of persons are injured by its action.213 This doctrine also prevails in EC law 
as demonstrated by the ECJ’s judgments in Schöppenstedt and Brasserie.214 There is lit-
tle doubt that this condition limits the access of individuals to justice at the national 
level. In fact, the introduction of additional conditions for the establishment of legisla-
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tive state liability has been strongly criticized for its reluctance to “de-sanctify” the leg-
islative function of the state.215 It must be accepted, however, that the protection re-
quired from Member States is merely one equivalent to the level of protection made 
available under EC legislation. Thus, the restrictive provisions for the establishment of 
state liability are a general problem applicable to judicial protection at both national and 
EU level. For the purposes of this paper, it suffices to state that the national provisions 
on legislative state liability in France and Italy are in compliance with EU standards, but 
are still restrictive for the access of EU citizens to justice. In contrast to this, the Greek 
position on this issue clashes with EC law and is another blow to the effective protec-
tion of individuals seeking damages due to breaches of EC law by the Greek authorities. 
 The analysis of the substantive conditions for the establishment of state liability 
in the three selected countries has revealed that protection to EU citizens is offered by 
reference to the provisions applicable in the case of claims for compensation against 
private persons. In fact, the substantive prerequisites of state liability seem to be very 
liberal for the applicants, who need not even prove the existence of fault in their claim. 
For the successful claim for compensation due to state liability, EU citizens need to es-
tablish a minimum set of conditions, whose content is unusually favourable for the ap-
plicants.216 These conditions are very similar to those introduced by the EU doctrine of 
state liability. This is due to the recognition of EC law as a source of national adminis-
trative law; a doctrine that encourages the highest administrative national courts to cre-
ate a state liability doctrine based on ECJ case-law.217 In fact, Zanobini argues that the 
development of a doctrine even considering the possibility of state liability due to legal 
acts demonstrates how state liability has departed from ordinary, civil liability for dam-




The analysis of the national provisions on the procedural and substantive conditions for 
the establishment of state liability in France, Italy and Greece has led to a number of 
valuable findings. Despite the existence of three types of courts in the selected jurisdic-
tions and the consequent creation of an administrative law of tort, state liability borrows 
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most of its provisions from the general doctrines of civil torts. The elements of state li-
ability are those applicable to any tort and include a wrongful administrative or legisla-
tive act, damage to the applicant and a causal link between the two. The requirements 
for the characterization of an act as wrongful are flexible in favour of the applicant. In-
deed, the inclusion of omissions in the concept of wrongful acts for the establishment of 
state liability can only be seen as an advantageous extension of the possible sources of 
state liability and, consequently, an amplification of the field of application of the liabil-
ity of the state. More importantly, the only condition for the classification of an act or 
omission as wrongful is its objective illegality. The subjective element of fault is not a 
prerequisite of liability. In fact, in Greece and Italy fault is not required at all, whereas 
in France the precondition of illegality as the exclusive means of demonstrating the ex-
istence of fault leads to its practical exclusion from the deliberation of the competent 
judges. This is reflected in recent judgments of the French courts who “intentionally” 
avoid all reference to fault.219 The unusual exclusion of subjective fault is of paramount 
assistance to applicants. Had the situation been different, they would have had to meet 
the impossible task of tracing negligence/intent to specific employees of the national 
authority and attributing percentages of it to members of the circle of administrative or 
legislative officials who dealt with the particular file. 
 The regulation of damage as an element of state liability is equally auspicious to 
the applicant. Replicating the most accommodating of provisions in this area of civil 
law, the legislator allows compensation for state liability even for future damages whose 
certainty (an essential characteristic) is debatable. Along the same generous lines is the 
provision on the nature of damages which may be compensated for. These include posi-
tive damage, moral damage and loss of the opportunity to make profit. It is the last type 
of damages which is of particular interest to applicants suffering harm due to breaches 
of EC law in the field of the freedom of establishment. The inclusion of perte de chance 
allows the applicants to seek restitution for the major part of their damages, which will 
derive most probably from the loss of the opportunity to establish in the host state or to 
trade in a particular field of commerce therefore preventing them from making profit. 
Even when the damages in question are difficult to quantify the applicant will receive 
some compensation. Moreover, in order to submit a successful claim, the applicant will 
have to prove that the harm occurred is a direct consequence of the act or omission of 
the state. This is another provision borrowed from the civil law of torts, which favours 
the theory of causa adequata in all three selected jurisdictions. The permissive substan-
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tive conditions for the establishment of state liability are complemented by a similarly 
accommodating doctrine of full compensation equal to the amount of money by which 
the applicants’ fortune decreased due to the act of the national authorities. 
 The evaluation of the substantive elements of state liability in France, Greece 
and Italy draws an ideal picture of tolerance and permissiveness in the relevant provi-
sions whose aim clearly is to allow applicants compensation for damages suffered as a 
result of a wrongful act or omission of the host state. This conclusion seems to be con-
firmed by reference to the doctrine of state liability due to wrongful legislative acts, 
which is recognized in France and Italy. Provided that the additional conditions of exis-
tence of a positive legislative act affecting only a closed circle of people are met, the 
applicant may claim compensation for damages suffered as a result of a national legisla-
tive text, whose provisions breach EC law. These conditions, albeit identical to those 
introduced by the EU doctrine of legislative state liability, in combination with the re-
luctance of some judges to apply the relatively new concepts of legislative state liability, 
render compensation due to this source somewhat uncertain.220 It is therefore more ef-
fective for the applicant to seek permission to establish or to trade in the host state, so 
that a precise administrative act, albeit prohibitive, is issued. This act will assist the ap-
plicant with the establishment of a sounder legal basis for compensation, as well as with 
the provision of information on the concrete competent administrative organ and the 
detailed reasoning for the rejection of the applicant’s request. This would be the only 
option available to the applicant in Greece, where legislative state liability is not ac-
cepted. In France and Italy, however, even though it is advisable for the applicant to try 
to establish state liability due to administrative acts or omissions, the recognition of leg-
islative state liability presents an additional legal basis for the claim for damages which 
can be of particular use in the admittedly rare cases, where permission by the authorities 
is not conceivable or extremely expensive and time-consuming. 
 Thus, in principle, the three selected jurisdictions award a high level of protec-
tion to individuals at the national level. From the point of view of the substantive provi-
sions, this is mainly due to the harmonization in the national case-law of EU Member 
States resulting from their reception of relevant ECJ and CFI precedents.221 However, 
this picture of effectiveness becomes somewhat tainted when the procedural conditions 
of compensation for state liability are examined. The first sign of problems appears well 
before the application for damages is lodged in the resolution of the preliminary issue of 
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the choice of competent court. The existence of three types of courts in the selected 
countries forces applicants to determine the court with the jurisdiction to rule on its ap-
plication for damages against the state, very early on in the process. Leaving aside the 
increased difficulty involved for applicants whose state of origin does not follow a sys-
tem of separate administrative court structure, the determination of the competent court 
seems a difficult task, mainly due to the complexity and fluidity of the criteria intro-
duced for this purpose. Greece is the only country of the three examined in this thesis, 
which has adequately resolved this problem through the express subjection of claims for 
compensation against the state to the competence of its administrative courts. In con-
trast, France seems to suffer from the fact that the rules determining the right court de-
rive from case-law and are therefore based on previous courts’ judgments on specific 
cases. This method of introduction of legal provisions is problematic in a civil law 
country where the value of precedent is only limited to the parties in each dispute. How-
ever, the French uncertainty and complexity is only minimal when compared to the Ital-
ian position. The latter is based on the doctrine of subjective rights and legitimate inter-
ests, which has been criticized for its complexity and distorting intricacy.222  
 These characteristics are carried onto the procedure of the trial, where the appli-
cant needs to refer the case first to the Italian administrative courts for the annulment of 
the wrongful act or declaration of illegality of the omission of the authorities and then to 
the Italian civil courts, which have the exclusive competence to adjudicate on the issue 
of compensation. This position creates delays in the dispensation of justice. Since a final 
decision by the administrative judge could take up to twenty years, there is little doubt 
that these long delays “threaten the efficiency of justice” and force individuals to turn to 
other routes of restitution outside the rules of law.223 Another consequence of the Italian 
position is the imposition of a double-risk for applicants, who are forced to face the 
common reluctance of national judges to identify their case as one tackling issues of EC 
law and to refer to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling twice.224 A third consequence of the 
two-trial Italian system is the constraint on the circle of persons with the locus standi to 
seek compensation, in terms of the grounds on which such claims may be successful, 
and in terms of the powers of the adjudicating judges. These are limited to the persons, 
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merits and powers introduced for actions for annulment of acts or omissions of national 
authorities. Therefore, they are not as extensive as the ones provided for in France and 
Greece. There claims for compensation can be based on all possible factual and legal 
grounds of illegality which may lead not only to the annulment but also to the modifica-
tion of the measure in question. It can be argued that this Italian handicap is counter-
acted by the increased protection offered by a double system of appeals and cassations. 
True as this argument may be, the resources and time constraints involved in such a 
long process render the detailed examination of the case before the Italian courts an ex-
ercise not worth pursuing for most applicants.225 Even if the time and money for the 
completion of this process, which may also entail preliminary rulings to the ECJ, were 
available, the French and Greek systems are preferable since the merit, locus standi and 
court power limitations still impede access to justice in Italy. 
 Another problem of the protection offered at the national level refers to the state 
privileges in the case of compensations for state liability. These involve shorter pre-
scription periods for the submission of appeals or cassations against judgments of the 
courts of first instance, which are introduced in a discriminatory manner in favour of the 
state. The introduction of shorter time-limits for the appeal of applicants against court 
decisions is a significant impediment to the access to justice. However, a crucial finding 
of this paper refers to the lack of mechanisms for the enforced execution of court judg-
ments in France and Greece. This signifies the lack of practical value of court judg-
ments against the state, whose authorities only execute court judgments if they so wish. 
The problem is one based on the constitutional principle of the separation of powers and 
extends in all judgments against the state, irrespective of the identity or nationality of 
the applicant. However, it can only be seen as a terrible blow to the fight of EU citizens 
to achieve restitution for damages suffered as a result of wrongful acts or omissions by 
the host state. In fact, it can be stated that both the shorter prescription periods and the 
Greek and French problem of execution against the state are national provisions which, 
albeit non-discriminatory, impede the efficiency of the protection of EU nationals at the 
national level considerably. 
 The main aim of this paper was to prove its hypothesis: the effectiveness of na-
tional remedies for breach of EC law is still rather doubtful. In achieving its aim, this 
paper has shown that our neglect of the procedural hurdles in state liability cases con-
tinues to render judicial protection at the national level a utopia for EU citizens.  
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